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The Advanced Launch System (ALS) is a challenge to industry and 
government to develop the first true operationally mature space 
flight system. As shown in figure 1, our early boosters were 
derived from ballistic missiles. Saturn was a special-case 
design put together in a time-constrained and dollar- 
unconstrained environment; Shuttle was and is a valuable 
development addressing reusability and manned spaceflight. None 
of these systems had the benefit of operational experience— 
experience which is invaluable both in understanding the 
operational requirements and in defining them to the designer.. 
None of these systems had the benefit of the lessons learned in 
working through a maze of design and programmatic choices whose 
implications we only now understand.
The ALS can benefit from these early lessons; it must benefit 
from them if it is to meet the program goals shown in figure 2. 
These lessons and the valuable historical data base are the 
foundation for ALS. But as shown in figure 3, ALS will also 
benefit from a considerably expanded, rapidly growing technology 
base. It will benefit from joint oversight by the USAF and NASA 
to take advantage of their complementary strengths and insights. 
It will benefit from several years of careful examination of 
fundamental issues on the STAS studies. Perhaps most 
importantly, ALS will benefit from the lack of a specific mission 
requirement. Under normal circumstances the lack of a specific, 
driving requirement would be considered the program f s fatal flaw. 
In reality it is crucial to creating the environment conducive to 
meeting ALS program goals.
Unlike Saturn, ALS is not a giant step in size, performance, or 
capability. ALS is not a technology showcase. ALS will be a 
workhorse transportation system—reliable, flexible, available, 
and low cost. ALS will remove the excitement from a launch day; 
eliminate the need for the excruciating reviews associated with 
current flight readiness decisions; end the painful process 
associated with payload- integration; and do away with the 
standing army that results in false economies, inflexibility in 
program planning, and ultimately in management ulcers. ALS will 
be a bore.....as an operational system should be. It will be an 
affordable utility, ready when it is needed and cheap enough to 
use.
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ALS issues are therefore unique. Technical trades are still 
essential; however, their scope is significantly increased and 
their evaluation criteria far broader. The challenge of the ALS 
program is not system design, but program design. This paper 
illustrates the implications of this challenge by examining 
several key issues and the approach required to address them in 
the ALS environment.
Since ALS is a cost driven program, the critical issues are those 
associated with the cost reduction approaches shown in figure 4 .
The first major approach, system productivity, is fundamental 
yet poorly understood. One major and surprising finding of the 
STAS illustrates this issue. It was commonly believed that the 
lowest cost system had to be fully reusable; after all, one could 
easily project the lowest cost per flight for such a system. 
However, this type system delivers a low fraction of its inserted 
mass as payload. This lower productivity per flight, magnified 
by mission requirements to either high inclination or high 
altitude, was its downfall when measured against the criteria for 
cargo delivery. The STAS recommended a partially reusable 
system, shown in figure 5. This system combines the high delivery 
efficiency of an expendable with recovery of high value 
components with least impact on the systems performance.
This issue is further illustrated in figure 6. The vehicle's 
efficiency, measured by its ratio of inert weight of expendable 
hardware with respect to payload delivered, has a tremendous 
effect on the allowable cost of that expendable hardware and upon 
the risk associated with delivering an ALS that meets its cost 
goals. By taking advantage of today's technology, ALS 
efficiency can be high enough to allow for realistic estimates of 
hardware costs. This is not a push towards a performance-driven 
System with low margins and high risk. It is a careful 
recognition that every pound that reaches orbit must pay the 
price of transportation.
The second major approach to cost reduction is recovery and reuse 
of high value components without significantly impacting the 
system's productivity. Much controversy surrounds this issue 
based on our first attempt at recovery and reuse on the STS. Can 
we afford the development costs? Can we make rational fleet 
sizing decisions? Can we control the refurbishment costs? How 
do we keep an industrial infrastructure intact?
Despite these issues and concerns, recovery and reuse must be 
implemented in some acceptable fashion if low costs are to be 
realistically achieved. As illustrated by figures 7,8, and 9 this 
trade study is extensive . However, in the long run it is less 
a trade study and more a study of how to implement recovery and 
reuse acceptably. We, have made considerable progress against 
this challenge. Engine cost has been a key factor in addressing 
this issue. A significant improvement in these costs has been 
forecast by the engine industry. These forecasts are rapidly
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approaching those of current costs (in an extremely competitive 
environment) for commercial airplane engines. Recovery still has 
advantages and mitigates the risk associated with achieving low 
cost projections. This characteristic"is critical to the 
program's flexibility and its capability of responding with low 
costs to reduced flight rates.
The third cost reduction approach, design-for-operations, was one 
of the direct outputs of the STAS, figure 10. As figure 11 
shows, we recognized that (1) we were swinging the pendulum from 
making vehicle design paramount (with operations an afterthought) 
to making operations paramount; and (2) in the long-run a careful 
balance must be struck between the two to achieve the lowest 
costs. To best illustrate the issues within this area, I've 
chosen to discuss payload integration and services . Throughout 
the STAS we drew on Boeing's commercial airplane experience, 
examining it for analogous situations. Figure 12 illustrates the 
impact of jet fleets, particularly the 747, on the air cargo 
market. As important to this tremendous growth as the 
efficiency/productivity of the aircraft was the movement to 
containerized cargo. Should we do the same in the launch vehicle 
world? Maybe not, but without swinging the pendulum in that 
direction, figure 13, we would not examine the issues in arriving 
at the optimum solution for space transportation where the nature 
of the cargo is substantially different. Impacting the 
resolution of this issue is the user or spacecraft communities 
response. Figure 14 illustrates the impact the ALS can have on 
spacecraft costs and therefore the total cost of space missions.
The last major cost reduction approach, low cost production, has 
significant issues to be resolved, but holds some of the most 
exciting potential for bringing the launch vehicle world up to 
and past today's standards in other industries. The challenge 
ALS faces is identifying the right degree of automation for its 
manufacture and applying automation at a scale of part size never 
approached in other industries.
These issues are difficult to resolve when dealt with 
independently. The ALS program cannot afford to do so if it is 
to meet its requirements. Our cost and operational requirements 
for reliability, dependability, and flexibility require that they 
always be considered in unison consistent with the ALS goals. 
When these issues are addressed in this fashion we are indeed 
engaged in program design and not system design. Program design 
is a new challenge for most of us, but if we meet it we can- 
confidently take a giant step forward in space transportation.
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• Thirty years ago we developed large rocket technology for ballistic missiles
• We converted these to space launchers
• We are still using that technology
• Other countries are now implementing or surpassing that technology
Figure 1. Space Transportation History
• Not performance driven
• No specific mission sets requirements
• Cost reduction mandatory
• 10:1 compared to Titan IV
• High reliability required
• Avoid outages
• Provide assured access to space
• Fly Titan and unmanned Shuttle payloads
Figure 2. ALS Requirements Are Unique
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Recovery of high value launcher elements 
(Soviet Energia)
Lightweight materials (U.S. and Soviet aircraft)
High chamber pressure rocket engines (Soviet 
Energia, Japanese LE-7, Ariane HM-60, U.S. 
Space Shuttle main engine)
Automated/low-manpower operations, computer­ 
ization (Japanese and U.S. industry)
Figures. New Technology is Emerging
Approaches
Increased productivity
(Higher performance for given size and 
cost)
• Lighter materials
• Engine improvements
Recovery/reuse of expensive components
(Where recovery does not jeopardize 
productivity)
• Recover engines, electronics, large 
valves, etc.
Advanced production techniques
(Low cost expendable hardware)
• CAD/CAM
• Automation
• In-process qualiity control
• Design to cost
Design for operations
(Eliminate costs of the "standing army")
• Auto processing and checkout 
. Built-in test
• Simplified operations
• Margins
A ten-fold cost reduction can be achieved
Figure 4. Cost Can Be Reduced
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Figure 5. The Right Amount of Expendability
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Launch
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hardware
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weight)
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500 -
Shown (or:
• 3/4 of launch cost Is from hardware
• Low orbit missions
• 10 STS SRB uses/Might
Fighters, $/lb delivered
Commercial jets, $/lb delivered
Payload cost/lb to low orbit:
4000
1000
400
2345678 
LV Inert weight per flight 
Payload weight
9 10
Figure 6. Only Efficiency (e.g., Low LV Weight) Yields Low Dollars/Pound
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All expendable
* Engine and avionics production costs required to meet cost goals
* Incorporation of features to meet reliability and operational goals
* Suborbital operations and associated range safety concerns
Partially expendable (core engines/avionics recovery)
* Technical feasibility/risk
- Landing accuracy
- Recovery system reliability
- Landing environment
* Operations costs
- Recovery weight penalty
- Range safety for recovery operations
- Recovery site
- Refurbishment manpower
- Flight operations
- Range and network
Production/operations infrastructure
- Fleet sizing and spares - Attrition and damage rates
- Cost of sustaining production - Logistics 
capability
Figure?. Objective ALS Core Stage All Expendable Versus Partially Expendable Issues
Concept Issues Factors considered
Engine and avionics costs DDT&E costs 
Theoretical first unit costs 
Learning
All expendable
Features to meet reliability and operational goals Level of redundancy
Engine out
Minimum cost ground and flight operations
Suborbital operations and range safety concerns Stage Impact
Payload circularization burn
Coupled launch vehlcte/payload mission planning
Range safety/inadvertent separation destruct
Partially expendable
Technical feasibility/risk 
• Landing accuracy
Recovery system reliability 
Landing environment
Recovery weight penalty
Range safety for recovery operations
. ETR and WTR
• Wilds
• GN&C accuracy
• Parachute reliability
• Other deorbit/landing subsystems reliabilities
• Reentry
• Landing impact
• Life
• Vehicle sizing
• Reliability/redundancy/casually probability
• ETR and WTR-IIP
• Range operation discussions with ETR
Figured. Scope of Trade Study
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Concept Issues Factors considered
Partially
expendable
(continued)
Operations costs 
• Recovery site
Refurbishment costs
Right operations
Range and network
Staffing/cost per flight 
Recovery equipment 
Sensitivities
Staffing/cost per flight 
Facilities
• Sensitivities
Staffing/recurring costs
• Non-recurring costs
• Flight rate sensitivities
t Nonrecurring costs
. Recurring time costs
. Flight rate sensitivities
Production/operations infrastructure 
• Fleet sizing and spares
Cost of sustaining production capability 
Attrition and damage rates 
Logistics and product support
Fleet sizing
Production decision time phasing
ETR and WTR operations
Module production/refurbishment 
Engines
Attrition sensitivities 
Refurbishment cost sensitivities
Sustaining engineering 
Sparing
Figure 9. Scope of Trade Study (Continued)
• Designing for Operations
Operations 
approaci
Ground 
and flight 
operations 
analysis to 
identify cost 
drivers
Ground and
mission control
design
Operationally
optimized
systems
Trade 
studies
Vehicle 
design
Low operations cost 
operational flexibility
Requires "right" environment
Figure 10. Total System Approach
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Dollars
• Requires 
careful 
balance of 
factors
• Requires 
careful 
attention 
to bookkeeping
Vehicle or 
transportation 
Optimum total costs
Operations or 
user dollars
Factors
Figure 11. Design for Operations
Key drivers
• Jet airplane fleets
• Containerized cargo
• 747 capacity/flexibility
1945 '60 „„ '65 Time
Low cost space transportation will create the market
Figure 12. Advanced Space Transportation-Market Development
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Truck Limousine
No ECS
No P/L access
No services
Containerized cargo
Dumped short
of orbit
Standard trajectory
High cost
• Bookkept against 
spacecraft system
Mission/S/C tailored 
service requirements 
• Extensive interfaces 
Unlimited access
Lowest costs at some 
middle ground of 
standarized services 
and interfaces
High cost
• Bookkept against
the transportation
system
Figure 13. Pay load Integration/Service
• Current spacecraft match launch capacity to the pound
• (The last launch vehicle modification is frequently to 
accommodate a specific spacecraft)
• Spacecraft designers choose subsystems on the basis 
of weight rather than cost
• Removing launch vehicle constraint could allow significant 
spacecraft cost savings
• Boeing "first principles" analysis: 
- 70% weight increase = 50% cost reduction
Figure 14. Spacecraft Cost Reduction
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